Cost Determination in Federal Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements: A Feasibility Study by Stanley, Preston Omar
COST DETERMINATION IN FEDERAL SECTOR 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: 
A FEASIBILITY STUDY 
By 
PRESTON OMAR STANLEY 
h 
Bachelor of Science 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
1973 
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College 
of the Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
December, 1975 
T~ 
19?~ 
5 788c.. 
~.)... 
J• 
COPYRIGHT 
By 
Preston Oniar Stanley 
1975 
935099 
; 
··)' 
; 
OKLAHOMA 
STATE UNIVERSITY 
LIBRARY 
MAR 24 1976 
COST DETERMINATION IN FEDERAL SECTOR 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: 
A FEASIBILITY STUDY 
Thesis Approved: 
Thesis Adviser 
12 /2 . r/f~ 
Dean of the Graduate College 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
It seems incumbent upon the writer to formally express gratitude 
to those individuals who provided support to this effort. Such is 
undertaken with no hesitancy, but with extreme difficulty. This study 
is a manifestation of the encouragement of innumerable people. 
Recognition is due my committee chairman, Dr. Carl R. Anderson, 
and members, Drs. John L. Baird, J. Kenneth St. Clair, and Kenneth 
Wiggins. 
Sincere gratitude is expressed to the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
for providing me the opportunity to complete an administrative intern-
ship in the Labor Relations Staff .of the United States Office of Educa-
tion Headquarters. I should especially like to thank the Office of 
Education Labor Relations Officer, Mr. Francis J. Loevi, Jr., and the 
professionals of the Labor Relations Staff, J. Stephen Gray, Esq., and 
Ralph R. Smith, for according me the opportunity to profit from their 
knowledge and experience. 
For their editorial assistance, and much more, I am indebted to 
Drs. Joan Baird and Nancy L. Knapp. Ms. Laurie E. Heard is recognized 
for her assistance in typing the preliminary draft. Mr. Greg Grason 
competently provided graphics assistance. For technical assistance in 
preparing the final draft and performing the other necessary tasks 
required to complete production of the paper, I gratefully acknowledge 
the contribution of Ms. Linda Baker. 
iii 
To all the students and faculty at Oklahoma State University with 
whom I have had the privilege of association, I expre,ss my gratitude 
for sharing a part of their educational experience with me. I am 
indebted to .Dr. Norman N. Durham, Dean of the Graduate College, for 
his guidance and support during much of my graduate experience. 
Special recognition is extended to Drs. John and Joan Baird and 
their children, Brian, Brendan, and Elizabeth, for helping me adjust 
to the environs of Washington, D. C. I cannot adequately express my 
gratitude for their having made me feel like a part of their family. 
Finally, I express my gratitude to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Marion 
Stanley; siblings, Florenc·e and Paul; and grandmother, Mrs. Sarah F. 
White, for their loving conc·ern and enthusiastic support. 
iv 
Chapter 
I. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Study .. 
Research Objectives . • 
Assumptions and Limitations 
II. REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE .• 
III. 
A Public-Private Dichotomy. 
Sovereignty ..•• 
Political-Economic Considerations. 
Conditions of Public Employment 
Nature of Work ...••....• 
Effects of the Political Process .. 
Division of Responsibility 
Open Meeting Laws •• 
Scope of Bargaining ...•.•••• 
A Federal-Nonfederal Dichotomy .•.••• 
Federal Sector: Historical Perspectives 
Executive Order 10988 .•.••.. 
Executive Order 11491 • • • • • • .• 
Federal Sector: Distinguishing Characteristics .• 
Level of Bargaining . • • . • • . • • . • . . 
Scope of Bargaining . . . . • . . • 
Relative Absence of Public Support. 
Bila teralism. • • . 
A COMPARISON OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
PROVISIONS • • . • . • . . • . . • . . . . • • • 
Commonalities in Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Comparison of Principal Agreement Provisions .• 
IV. COST ISSUES IN FEDERAL SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS . • • . . 
A Cost Typology . 
~ Facto Costs • 
Proviso Costs. 
Direct Proviso Costs. 
Indirect Proviso Costs. 
Productivity . • • • • • • • 
Impact on Personnel Administration 
v 
Page 
1 
4 
5 
5 
7 
8 
9 
12 
12 
12 
14 
14 
14 
15 
18 
18 
18 
21 
21 
22 
23 
24 
24 
27 
27 
31 
36 
38 
39 
40 
41 
41 
42 
45 
Chapter 
Benefits . . • . . . • . • • 
Framework of Cost Relationships 
Processual Relationships . 
Source-Cost Relationships. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • 
vi 
Page 
46 
47 
47 
49 
51 
55 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 
I. Growth of Exclusive Recognition in Federal Government 
Employment. • • • . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . 
II. Characteristics of Federal Sector Agreements. 
III. Characteristics of Agreements in State and Local 
Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . 
IV. Characteristics of Indus tria 1 Agreements. 
v. A Comparison of Principal Provisions Included 
Collective Bargaining Agreements. . . . . . 
LIST .OF FIGURES 
Figure 
1 .. A Framework for Analysis of Collective Bargaining 
Agreements . • • • • . 
2. Collective Bargaining Outcomes and Costs 
3. Collective Bargaining Costs: Type and Source. 
vii 
in 
. 
. . 
Page 
4 
. . . 29 
30 
32 
. . . 33 
Page 
47 
48 
49 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Public employee unionism in the federal government has a longer 
history than many individuals realize, dating back even to the early 
1800s. Such unionism was quite limited - Navy shipyard craftsmen, 
Government Printing Office employees, and Postal employees have lengthy 
history of unionism. Their specific activities were as limited, how-
ever, as the phenomenon of unionism in the federal government; by 
current standards, it amounted to little more than lobbying activity 
(1, p. 1). 
It was not until the 1960s ):hat the true impetus in the field of 
public employee organization was realized. During' that decade, unionism 
surfaced as an important issue in public employment, not only in the 
federal government, but in state and local governments as well. Many 
suggest that the genesis of recent public employee unionism was sparked 
by President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988. Though it has been 
hailed as the "Magna, Carta" for pub lie employee unionism, it a lone 
could not have effected the momentum in public sector collective 
bargaining that has been experienced during the last decade (1, p. 3). 
Actually, the Kennedy Order only escalated to national prominence 
an issue that had been developing at lower levels of the governmental 
structure. New York City and the state of Wisconsin had already imple-
mented practices conducive to public labor relations programs (2, p. 101). 
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Conditions in the social milieu of the United States had an 
important impact on the development of public collective bargaining. 
These include the population growth, increased social consciousness, 
the pressures of the competitive labor market, a decline of the "labor 
movement" and the impact of inflation. But these are only a few of 
many facets contributing to the intumescence in public employee organ• 
ization growth and activism (3, p. 2). Stanberg identifies eight 
factors that had a significant impact: 
(1) the inability of an individual worker in a large 
bureaucracy to be heard by his employers unless he 
speaks in a collective voice; 
(2) a growing sentiment within the less mobile, un-
skilled, semiskilled, and clerical labor force 
that concerted organized action is needed to in-
crease their earning power and to protect their 
rights; 
(3) a greater appreciation by'public employee organiza-
tions of the effectiveness of collective bargaining 
techniques used in the private sector; 
(4) an awareness among many unions that their strength 
in private industry is on the wane, and that the 
public service represents a virtually untapped field 
for productive organizational efforts; 
(5) the financial resources and expertise of national 
unions in assisting public employee groups to organize 
and present their demands to management; 
(6) the aggressiveness of public employee unions which 
has caused many long-established associations to 
adopt a more beligerent stance; 
(7) the spillover effect in state and local governments 
of Executive Order 10988 which gave strong support 
to the principle of the public employee's right to 
organize; and 
(8) finally - and perhaps most importantly - the "head-
in-the-sand" attitude of many public employers, rooted 
in the traditional concept of the prerogatives of the 
sovereign authority and distrust of the economic, 
political, and social objectives of unions ... (4, 
p. 103). 
Tyler cogently suggests that three forces primarily responsible 
for stimulating the growth of public employee unionism are 1) class 
awareness, 2) political ambience, and 3) the civil rights movement. 
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He notes that the civil rights movement is important because its 
success inspired public workers, many of whom were minority, to carry 
their efforts further (2, p. 101). 
These factors were. joined by another important reality of the 
American economy. · Since World War II, three of every ten new jobs 
have been in the public sector (4, p. 102). That fact alone would 
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tend to create interest and promote activity in public sector unionism. 
Though these factors help to explain the development of labor 
unionism in the public sector, an ~ eost facto analysis of the reasons 
for such a phenomenal growth is not only difficult, but of .doubtful 
value. Identification of all such factors contributing to the develop-
ment of public sector collective bargaining is neither the intent nor 
within the scope of this document.· 
The actual magnitude of the increase in public employee unionism 
is difficult to identify during the ·early stages of its development. 
However, the growth of unionism in the entire public sector is reflected 
by the figures of federal sector unionism. Table I illustrates the 
growth of exclusive recognition in the federal sector (5, p. 26). 
Placing these figures into perspective by relating them to the 
total number of employees in the federal government sector makes the 
growth even more apparent. Only 12 percent of federal employees were 
in unions in 1964; but by 1974, the 1, 142,419 employees in exclusive 
units represented 57 percent of the total federal work force (5, p. 26). 
Although it has been thirteen years since the signing of Executive 
Order 10988, which is credited with inducing major activity in col-
lective bargaining in the public sector, much of federal management is 
still uncomfortable with many aspects of the process of collective 
bargaining. Perhaps one of the most common areas of conern by federal 
managers is that of the "costs" of collective bargaining. The treat-
ment of the topic as yet is very much of a void; it seems to promote 
obfuscation at even the highest levels. There has been no delineation 
of principles or systematic examination of the costs of collective 
bargaining. 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 (Nov) 
1968 (Nov) 
1969 (Nov) 
1970 (Nov) 
1971 (Nov) 
1972 (Nov) 
1973 (Nov) 
197L~ (Nov) 
TABLE I 
GROWTH OF EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION IN 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT 
Purpose of the Study 
180,000 
231,000 
320,000 
435,000 
630,000 
798,000 
843,000 
916,000 
1,038,288 
1,082,527 
l,086,361 
1,142,491 
This study will examine the feasibility of development of an 
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empirical planning model for cost determination in federal sector col-
lecti.ve bargaining agreements. 
Research Objectives 
The following objectives were necessary to accomplish the purpose 
of the study: 
that: 
1. to identify commonalities in federal sector collective bar-
gaining agreements. 
2. to analyze cost factors of the identified connnonalities of 
federal sector collective bargaining in their institutional 
and organizational settings. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
The underlying premises governing the study were the assumptions 
1. cost increases will be the primary focus of agency concern; 
2. federal sector agency management will demand a predictive 
mathematical model for the planning process; 
3. only directly identifiable and quantifiable cost factors 
should be incorporated into a model; 
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4. the application of a model will be most restricted for general 
schedule employees conducting white-collar activities, and 
that case is the one with which federal agency management is 
concerned. 
Because of the inherent dynamism present in any process of federal 
concern, and especially in an area very much in its adolescence, as is 
federal sector labor-management relations and collective bargaining, 
an implicit caveat must be added to those above in the interpretation 
and appli.cation of the study. Further, the study is limited by the 
nature and availability of the pertinent data utilized in Chapter III. 
It is assumed that no dramatic shift has occurred since compilation. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE 
History 'of the labor unionism in the United States during the 
twentieth century has been divided into three major development periods. 
The three periods parallel the emergence and development of three very 
different segments of the labor force. The first period includes the 
era beginning about 1900 and continuing until the mid-1930s in which 
the unionization of skilled craftsmen was evident. The second period, 
from the mid-1930s until the mid-1950s, brought about the rise of the 
semiskilled and unskilled laborers involved in mass manufacturing 
industries. The third period, starting in the 1960s, heard the cries 
for recognition by white-collar workers of the primarily service-
oriented portion of the economy. Many of these workers were publicly 
employed, not only in federal employment, but state and local as well 
(2, p. 98). 
The review of literature, d,ivided into three sections_, is intended 
to provide the reader with an appropriate background of collective 
bargaining in the public sector, with certain comparisons to the private 
sector. In addition, it attempts to provide the reader an examination 
of federal sector collective bargaining, including its dynamic nature 
and typical characteristics, and to establish the uniqueness of the 
federal sector as a segment of the public sector. 
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A Public-Private Dichotomy 
American approaches to management have typically been divided 
according to the institutional nature of the organization of which it 
8 
is a part: public or private. Historically, this separation has been 
so clear as to even be reflected by academic terminology. "Management" 
was applied to the function in the private sector; "administration" 
became its counterpart in the public sector. Murray suggests that the 
bridge between "management" and "administration" has recently been 
closed and a school of "general management" has resulted. A convergence 
seems to be developing (6, p. 364). 
There is no doubt that collective bargaining has had a dramatic 
impact on the management function - in both the private and public 
sectors. What seems to remain unanswered is the extent to which con-
vergence similar to that of the management function as examined by 
Murray is occurring in the area of collective bargaining. It seems 
somewhat unlikely that a specific process, like collective bargaining, 
will show the same convergence that Murray attributes to the general 
management function. Quite to the contrary, public sector collective 
bargaining seems much more pervasive. Anderson notes, "the advent of 
unionism in the public employment has also sparked a dynamic social 
experiment to determine whether the principles and procedures of private 
sector collective bargaining can be applied to the public sector" (7, 
p. 986). This suggests that public sector collective bargaining is 
not merely a transplantation from the private sector. 
An element partially responsible for confounding the comparative 
examination of public and private sector collective bargaining is that 
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the two did not evolve simultaneously. That, however, is history and 
as such is irreversible. There seems to be several issues that clearly 
characterize the collective bargaining process in each sector, and make 
each distinct. While several of these issues are singular in their 
observed effect, it is important to note their individual existence and 
contribution to the differences. 
Sovereignty 
Some authors have analyzed the issue of sovereignty as "too elusive 
and too remote a concept to be of practical significance in the fashion-
ing of labor policy" (4, p. 1109). While these authors may indeed be 
correct that it should not fashion labor policy, it has had an effect. 
As has been noted by Connery, there seems to be an attitude that "public 
employees by definition have a 'higher calling' to the 'sovereign"' 
(8, p. 329). Some practicioners deem the issue of sovereignty dead 
(9). .While in practice, sovereignty per se may indeed be an outdated 
issue; it seems to have formed the basis for many of the issues with 
which public collective bargaining is concerned. 
Sovereignty, according to Black's Law Dictionary, is defined as 
"the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any inde-
pendent state is governed . • , " and, as the "supreme political 
authority." Accordingly, sovereignty may be exercised by an individual, 
or in the case of many contemporary societies, in the form of a "body 
politic" (10, p. 146). 
Sovereignty in the United States was derived more from a political-
legal base than from the moral-legal base evident in the English deriva-
tion. .A,t the time of American independence, founding fathers invoked 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity to entice the states to ratify the 
Cons ti tu ti on. Sovereign inmmni ty exempted states from lawsuits filed 
by private citizens to whom the states were financially indebted, 
unless the states consented to the suits (11, p. 41). 
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There is some academic debate regarding the concept of sovereignty 
in English Common law as stated by Blackstone in his Commentaries, "The 
King can do no wrong." Though disagreement exists concerning this 
maxim's assumed concrete meaning, it has been such an understanding of 
sovereignty that has become accepted and applied in governmental 
employment in the United States. The application of sovereignty with 
respect to public employment, has three primary components: 
1. government has the power to fix conditions of employment; 
2. such power is unique and cannot be delegated or shared; 
3. any organized effort to interfere with this power is unlawful 
( 12' p. 22). 
These components have been tactily, if not overtly, recognized 
and accepted for many years. Little imagination is required to see 
the effect that they have had on the shaping of policy relating to 
government employment. But to attempt to trace the basis of sover-
eignty is a much more difficult proposition. Though one may histor-
ically examine the derivation of the sovereignty principle, it is 
impossible to isolate it from the present legal framework to adjudge 
its singular nature or characteristics. "Sovereignty," in the words 
of Andrew Hacker, "is not something that can be identified or dis-
covered. It is on the contrary, a process. In other words, it is the 
interaction of specified individuals and institutions according to 
specified rules and procedures" (10, p. 147). 
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Sover.ei.gnty, then has explicitly defined the source of ultimate 
authority. It has not, however, much to the disappointment of critics, 
spoken to the issue of "how government as an employer ought to 
exercise" supreme power. (Emphasis Added.) But sovereignty, as the 
basis of the doctrine of the illegal delegation of power, has an impact 
on the scope of collective bargaining in public employment (L~, p. 1109). 
Labor-management relations established by state statutes and 
federal executive orders carefully preserve the sovereignty doctrine. 
The most recent changes in the federal government policies governing 
labor-management relations, Amendments to Executive Order 11491, care-
fully protect the sovereignty of the federal government. It specifies, 
in part: 
Each agreement between an agehcy and a labor organization is 
subject to the following requirements--
(a) in the administration of all matters covered by the agree-
ment, officials and employees are governed by existing or 
future laws and regulations of appropriate authorities, 
including policies set forth in the Federal Personnel Manual, 
by published agency policies and regulations in existence at 
the time the agreement was approved; and by subsequently 
published agency policies and regulations required by law or 
by the regulations of appropriate authorities, or authorized 
by the terms of a controlling agreement at a higher agency 
level; 
(b) management officials of the agency retain the right, in 
accordance with applicable laws and regulations--
(1) to direct employees .of the agency; 
(2) to hire, promote, trans.fer, assign, and retain 
employees in positions within the agency, and 
to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other 
disciplinary action against employees; 
(3) to relieve employees from duties because of lack 
of work or for other legitimate reasons; 
(4) to maintain the efficiency of the Government 
operations entrusted to them; 
(5) to determine the methods, means, and personnel 
by which such -Operations are to be conducted; 
(6) to take whatever actions may be necessary to 
carry out the mission of the agency in situations 
of emergency .•. (13, p. 1156). 
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Imundo notes that this portion of the Order "carefully delineates 
management's rights in unilateral decision making" in many aspects of 
federal employment. Many state and local laws reflect the same tone 
as that of the federal Executive Order (14, p. 812). 
Political - E.£gnomic Considerations 
Examination of political-economic considerations helps elucidate 
important differences between the public sector and the private sector. 
Important topics in this examination include conditions of public 
employment, the nature of work performed, and the effects of the 
political process in public sector employment. 
Conditions of Public Employment 
Four conditions of public employment differentiate it from private 
employment. Summers notes that;, 
1. decisions as to terms and conditions of employment are 
made through the political process; 
2. the employer is the public, and ultimately the voters 
to whom public officials are responsible; 
3. voters sharing the employer's economic interests far 
outnumber those sharing the employees' interests; 
4. public employees can and do (even without collective 
bargaining) normally participate in determining terms 
and conditions of employment (15, p. 1159). 
These conditions illustrate that public employment is not ·11 just another 
industry." 
Nature of Work 
The nature of the work performed in the public sector is vastly 
different from that of much of the private sector; it is primarily 
service-orLented, while much of the private sector is goods-oriented. 
Work in the public sector falls into two categories - direct service 
and indirect service. The distribution of service is primarily one 
of an inverse relationship between the proportion of direct service 
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and the distance of the level of government from the consuming public. 
That is, the proportion of direct service is highest at the local level; 
the fed.era 1 leve 1 provides little direct service (16, p. 545). 
Many would argue that service-orientation is present in the private 
economy. Its existence there cannot be disputed, but raises two 
additional points - voluntarism and the public interest. 
In the private sector, the consuming public exercises voluntary 
support of private organizations. In the public sector, however, the 
consumer has much less choice in support of organizations. Monopolies 
often exist in the supply of direct services. In the case of indirect 
services, the consumer must suppor·t the service activity as a member 
of the tax-paying public (16, p. 546). 
This underscores a basic political-ecnomic difference in the two 
sectors. As Bennett notes, "There is neither profit nor competition in 
the public service, and the public employer can neither go out of busi-
ness nor mov.e the operations. Public management has an ongoing responsi-
bility to p~ovide service continuously . . 11 (16, p. 548). 
Further, while government must cover the increased labor costs 
primarily by increasing taxes, private sector organizations can meet 
rising costs in a number of ways. First, they can raise prices. 
Second, they can increase efficiency. Finally, the private sector can 
absorb costs by reducing profits. Imundo concludes that the latter 
two of these options are unavailable in the public sector. As he 
notes: 
Generally, it is easier for firms producing goods to 
increase efficiency than firms producing services. 
The product of government is service. Therefore, it 
is often difficult for government to increase 
efficiency .... Government cannot absorb increased 
costs by reducing profits because government does not 
produce profit as defined by accountancy practices 
(14, p. 814). 
Effects of lli Political Process 
The political process in the public sector places additional 
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constraints on public employment, and influences collective bargaining. 
Two important facets of the poli tica 1 process are 1) "executive-
legislative" or "adminis tra tive-legis lative" division of res pons i-
bility; and 2) the presence of open meeting laws. 
Division of Responsibility. The "executive-legislative" division 
of responsibility poses a special problem to collective bargaining in 
public employment. It often sends to the bargaining table an adminis-
trator or executive who, though responsible for reaching settlement, 
may not have the power to grant certain demands. This is perhaps most 
evident when an administrator reaches agreement with union representa-
tives concerning monetary issues (salaries, wages, or benefits), but 
the legislative body responsible for funding either refuses or is unable 
to allot funds for the settlement (17). 
Open Meeting Laws. Another problem peculiar to the public sector 
settlement of issues during collective bargaining is that of open 
meeting laws, or "sunshine laws" (7, p. 986). The conduct of collective 
bargaining in an open forum not only creates increased interest by the 
public in labor relations, but results in increased publicity and 
public participation. This intervention in the collective bargaining 
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process by "outside" parties may needlessly complicate the resolution 
of issues during negotiations (17). 
Scope .Qi. Bargaining 
The wide diversity within the public sector is a deterrent to any 
concise evaluation of the scope bf bargaining sector-wide, and any 
subsequent comparison to the collective bargaining experience in the 
private sector. Since the public sector includes not only the federal 
government, but state, county, and municipal governments as well, a 
plethora of governing regulations exist, and variances among the 
applicable regulations and laws prohibit any useful attempt at develop-
ment of a single conceptualization of public sector collective bargain-
ing. 
Notable differences exist in the issues subject to bargaining in 
the two sectors. But attempts to assess the public sector from private 
experience is practically impossfble. As Sunnners notes: 
Borrowing concepts of bargainable subjects from the private 
sector can be misleading for two ~easons. First, in the 
private sector, collective barga'ining is fil only instrument 
through which employees ca11; have any effective voice in 
determining the terms and conditions of employment . • . 
Second, in defining bargainable subjects in the private 
sector, the government is establishing boundaries for 
the dealing between private parties. In the public sectdr, 
however, gove;rnment is establishing structures and pro-
cedures for making il§. ~ decisions ... (15, p. 1193). 
(Emphasis Added.) 
That is not, however, to rule the experience with private sector 
collective bargaining totally irrelevant. Obviously, to an extent, 
the dynamics of bargaining for the sides involved should be much the 
same. And since there is a tendency for some ''migration" to the public 
sector from the private sector, many parties will carry with them 
experiences and learned behaviors emanating from and principally 
applicable .to the private sector (15). 
There are several central problems that engulf the scope of bar-
gaining. Wellington and Winters have noted three such issues (18, 
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p. 22). First, trade-offs in the public sector are "less of a protec-
tion to the consumer" than in the private sector. Second, as has been 
voiced by numerous other authors, pub lie employees generally do not 
produce a product, but rather, perform a service, and the manner in 
which the service is provided may become a subject of collective 
bargaining. Finally, services provided by government are often per-
formed by professionals who consider their responsibilities as "not 
merely a job to be done for a salary." Their underlying philosophy 
regarding their profession often influences the process of bargaining. 
This has led some authors to conclude that collective bargaining is 
either inappropriate or impossible in areas of employment in which 
employees are largely professional. 
In the private sector, the scope of bargaining is established 
to include "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment" (19). While an extensive interpretation of this 
provision is not germa.ne to this document, the breadth of interpreta-
tion should possibly be noted. Hampton notes 'that the application of 
this provision is sufficiently broad to include job and union security 
and inunense indirect benefits in addition to those issues specified 
above (20, p. 503). 
But in the public sector, the scope of bargaining has gone beyond 
these iss.ues into "the domain of basic governmental policy (7, p. 997). 
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As Frazier notes, this intrusion has created serious questions regard-
ing public interest: 
The particular interest groups or constituencies that 
may oppose union demands on one topic are not necessarily the 
same as those that may be rallied round another, and most 
importantly, they rarely have direct access to the bargaining 
table. As a result, the public employer faced with a bar-
gaining proposal that deals both with terms and conditions of 
employment and with a public policy issue of substantial 
interest to the public (such as the length of a school year) 
will tend to be exposed at the bargaining table only to the 
arguments and pressures of its employees, in weighing the 
relative merits of the proposal. The result would be, it 
is said, to provide the union members, as citizens, with a 
disproportionate voice in the resolution of public affairs 
(21, p. 9). 
The demand for such an intrusion by public employee unions has 
often developed from the issue of employee professionalism cited 
earlier. Additionally, public sector collective bargaining has not 
emerged in a statutory void. The bargaining relationship and scope 
of bargaining have been affected by existing Civil Service provisions 
and antecedent legislation (22, p. 173). 
Comparison of collective bargaining in the public and private 
sectors has been summarized by Wellington and Winters. While their 
comments are directed toward municipalities, they seem equally appli-
cable to other levels of public employment concerned with collective 
bargaining: 
Collective bargaining in public employment, then, seems 
distinguishable from th&t in ·the, private sector. To 
begin with, it imposes on society more than a potential 
misallocation of resources through restrictions on 
economic output, the principal cost imposed by private 
sector unions. Collective bargaining by public employees 
and the political process cannot be separated ... (18, 
p. 22). (Emphasis Added.) 
It is this inescapable integration of public employment with the 
political process and the concomitant public interest issues that form 
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the basis for many of the differences between collective bargaining in 
the public and private sectors. However, within the public sector, 
the federal sector is unique. Several issues differentiate it from 
the remaining portion of the public sector. 
A Federal-Nonfederal Dichotomy 
Federal Sector: Historical Perspectives 
The experience of the federal s:ector with public employee unionism 
could be historically examined in a number of ways. The development of 
federal collective bargaining could be divided into stages of "growth" 
corresponding to each of the Presidential Executive Orders which have 
dealt with the subject - 10988, 11491, 11616, 11636, and 11838. To 
break fifteen years of experience into five categories with the very 
limited time included in each renders the subject to somewhat too 
microscopic scrutinization for th.e purposes of this document. Con-
sidering that the major change in the development of the federal sector 
labor-management relations program was· that which occurred when Execu-
tive Order 11491 was issued, it is somewhat more justifiable to examine 
the federal experience under the framework of a dichotomy. A corrnnon 
approach to examining the federal se'ctor collective bargaining' experi-
ence is to look first at the experience under the Kennedy Executive 
Order, 10988, issued in 1962, and second, examine the developments 
since the Nixon Executive Order, 11491, issued in 1969. 
E,Aecutive O~ 10988 
Executive Order 10988 provided for collective bargaining, the 
recognition of unions, and protection of the right of federal employees 
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to organize. However, its significance was not that it developed a 
system of collective bargaining. Rather, it removed the previous legal 
impediments that had prevented such activities prior to the Order. 
Its effect was more to provide the "spark" for the genesis of col-
lective bargaining in much of the public sector than it was to set in 
motion a positive program for federal sector collective bargaining 
(23, p. 73). As has been noted, however, 10988 was preceded by labor-
management efforts 'in New York City and the State of Wisconsin. 
The Executive Order issued by Kennedy has been called a "courageous 
and innovative act" (23, p. 75). That, however, is probably overstating 
the case. While it served to ·erase the notion that public employment 
(especially federal employment) was no place for unionism, its signing 
may have been more pragmatic than innovative. When he signed the Order 
President Kennedy noted, that "the public interest remains the dominant 
consideration" (24). This could be a reflection of the threat of 
pending legislation. As Connery notes: 
The 1962 Executive Order system of labor relations in the 
federal sector institutec;l by Pres'ident Kennedy was a 
jerry-built system initiated.to diffuse the pressure for 
collective bargaining legislation for federal employees 
building in Congress (8, p. 305). 
The Rhodes bill, though given no chance of enactment, possibly 
spurred Kennedy to "produce an acceptable substitute" (1, p. 3). 
Despite these circumstances prompting its issuance, the Order has been 
characterize.d as a "fine first step toward extending to Federal workers 
their rights to union representation and collective bargaining" (25, 
p. 241.). Under 10988, substantial gains were made in labor management 
relations. 
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However, Executive Order 10988 has been analyzed by Weber to have 
"major deficiencies which reflected a persistent ambivalence" (23, 
p. 74). First, the Order provided for three levels of representation -
exclusive, formal, and informal. The type of recognition afforded a 
union depended upon the percentage of employees from the appropriate 
unit who held union membership. The administrative arrangements 
required by the various recognition levels were only short of chaotic. 
A second deficiency was that the primary responsibility for the enforce-
ment of the Order was lodged with the agencies. Third, the Executive 
Order permitted only a very narrow scope of bargaining. Finally, no 
provision was included for constructive development of impasse resolu-
tion techniques. 
Though some agreement may be ~eached regarding the last three of 
these "deficiencies," the first probably created more problem for 
management than for unions. Indeed, the loss of the multi-stage 
recognition hurt many unions and professional organizations (26, p. 399). 
Further, the multi-stage recognition was partially responsible for 
easing the organization of white-collar employees. It is unlikely that 
as great a stride would have been made if 10988 had provided only for 
exclusive recognition (9). 
Executive Order 10988 was, at most, a modest beginning. But it 
was realistic too. It acknowledged that general inexperience existed 
on both the part of the unions and federal agency management. However, 
by 1969, another realism emerged - that it was time to adjust the 
policies of the Executive Order due to changing conditions in federal 
labor-management relations programs. 
21 
Executive Order 11491 
Richard Nixon's Executive Order ll491, "Labor-Management Relations 
in the Federal Service," resulted from the reconnnendations of an 
Interagency Study Committee chaired by Civil Service Connnission Chair-
man Robert E. Hampton. The report of the "Wirtz Committee," a review 
connnittee established by President Lyndon B. Johnson (27), formed the 
basis for the reconnnendations transmitted to Nixon (28, p. 9). 
The Nixon Order strengthened the program of federal collective 
bargaining under Executive Order 10988 by eliminating three of the 
four major deficiencies that had existed. First, the Order provided 
for exclusive recognition by unions, and phased out the formal and 
informal processes. Second, it provided for a mechanism for the 
administration of the Order resting with the Assistant Secretary of 
Labor for Labor-Management Relations. Finally, explicit attention 
was given to the problem of impasse resolution by the creation of the 
Federal Services Impasse Panel. 
While these did much to improve the stature of federal sector 
collective bargaining, one major deficiency is generally acknowledged -
the scope of bargaining. The three subsequent Executive Orders - 11616, 
11636, and 11838 - have attempted to correct the deficiency in that 
area, and have made some improvements, within the confines of the 
ex is ting lega 1 framework (2 9, p. 111). 
Federal Sector: Distinguishing Characteristics 
The foregoing examination of the experience of the federal sector 
with collective bargaining places the issue in a historical framework. 
While it is important to note the developmental evolution of federal 
sector collective bargaining, an analysis of substantive is·sues will 
establish the difference between the federal sector and the remainder 
of the public sector. 
The public sector, as has been previously indicated, is composed 
of not only the federal government, but state and local governments 
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as well. Wide diversity exists among components of the public sector. 
However, comparison of certain characteristics establish the federal 
portion of the ·public sector as unique. 
Some of these characteristics amount to a further development of 
ones considered in the public-private dichotomy. Primary examination 
will be given to four areas: first, the level of bargaining; second, 
the scope of bargaining; third, the relative absence of public support 
as a source of power; and, fourth, bilateralism as an approach to 
labor-management relations. 
Level .Qi Bargaining 
It seems fundamental that unions desire to bargain with the party 
having the authority to make an appropriate decisio.n regarding pro-
posals that may be presented (30, · p. 251). This condition is often 
unattainable in the federal sector since managers responsible for 
collective bargaining do not ex~rcise control over many issues and 
conditions of employment. It is difficult in the public sector to 
·separate the effects of the level of bargaining, (who participates in 
bargaining as management), and the scope of bargaining (the issues 
subject to bargaining). This condition is confounded in the federal 
sector due to ambiguity that exists regarding ·~ the employer really 
is (22, p. 108). 
Scope of Bargaining 
Effective collective bargaining has been said to be dependent 
upon two conditions - first, the ex:istence of two sides, each with a 
reasonable amount of power; and second, the existence of a reasonably 
wide range of permitted issues (15, p. 1156). However, these con-
ditions, too, are especially troublesome in the federal sector. 
Wirtz has noted that collective bargaining has essentially grown 
up on a theory of economic .force. He states: 
.•• its essential motive power is the right of either side 
to say "no,". regardless of justification or lack of it, and 
to back this up by shutting down the operation. To believe 
deeply in the efficacy of collective bargaining and to 
recognize fully that it has contributed immeasurably to 
economic and social welfare, is not to be blinded to the 
fact that it has been much more an interplay of economic 
power than an exercise in pure reason (31, p. 403). 
This is not the case in the federal sector. Weber notes some of 
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the reasons for the absence of economic interplay in the federal sector. 
He states: 
Collective bargaining -• or what passes for collective 
bargaining -- is superimposed.on a well-developed, elaborate, 
and explicit system of personnel administration that is 
calculated to deal with the wide range of substantive and 
procedural matters that are of concern to any group of 
employees (23, p. 70). 
Weber notes several elements included in this system. Three merit 
specific consideration. First, basic conditions of employment are 
established by statute .. Second, basic levels of compensation are not 
subject to managerial discretion nor to th.e exercise of economic 
sanction by employee organizations. Finally, elements of the wage 
structure as well as levels of compensation are determined by statute 
and by Congress. These three elements noted by Weber effectively 
remove the issue of "economics" from federal sector collective 
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bargaining, significantly reducing the scope of bargaining. As Newland 
states, "The Union can rarely look to .federal managers for a quid pro 
.quo, since pay and benefits are not bargainable" (32, p. 58). This 
is not the case in the remainder of the public sector. In much of 
the public sector wages and salaries are appropriate subjects of bar-
gaining. 
Relative Absence of Public Support 
The effect of the political nature of collective bargaining 
impinges differently on the two portions of the public sector, a condi-
tion that arises chiefly from the consideration of the type of service 
provided. State and local government employees largely provide direct 
service, while the federal sector generally provides indirect service. 
As such, the public interest-public service issue is quite different. 
In the state and local governments, employees can elicit support and 
empathy for their positions during bargaining (even absent strikes) 
much easier than can federal sector employees. This amounts to the 
loss of the possibility of public support (consumer influence) during 
collective bargaining. This condition is joined by an expressed 
absence of the right to strike (33), which has been upheld by the 
courts (34). 
Bi la tera lism 
These realisms of the fede.ral sector milieu of collective bar-
gaining have combined to generate a unique approach to labor-management 
relations: bilateralism. Ingrassia provides the definition of 
bila tera lism: 
Bilateralism is a form of personnel management under which 
employees, through their chosen union representatives, 
participate meaningfully and effectively in the formulation 
and implementation of personnel policies and practices which 
affect their working conditions. As such, bilateralism 
extends to the totality of union-management relations .•. 
(35, p. 12). 
Wallerstein further supplements this definition. He notes that 
one of the underlying assumptions of this type of program is that the 
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well-being of the employees ~ efficient administration of the govern-
ment res.ult (36, p. 28). 
But in many cases, such bilateralism is only of modest proportions. 
This is explained by Weber. In the area of personnel administration, 
he notes that: 
• the departments have very little discretion. They 
deal with what you might call second-order administrative 
aspects: seeing that the rules are followed, by generally 
not developing the rules thems'elves, or the character of 
the rules (23, p. 71). 
Hence, true "bilateralism" seems :evasive in practice. Connery notes: 
Despite its declarations of 'high purpose, the Executive 
Order has failed to promote or even foster true "bilateral-
ism" in the Federal sector •.• management unilaterally 
produced Executive Order 11491, which precludes any effec-
tive voice .for Federal employees and their union repre-
sentatives despite its verbiage designed to give the 
impression of bilateralism .... By its terms, the 
Executive Order prevents employees from negotiating in 
areas that have a significant impact on their job •.. 
(8' p. 298). 
There are major differences in federal sector collective bar-
gaining from its counterpart in the remainder of the public sector; 
much greater limitations are placed on the bargaining environment in 
the federal sector. Few of the "bread and butter" issues are subject 
to bargaining in the federal sector. In other areas, such as personnel 
administration, federal managers involved in collective bargaining can 
often offer the union no quid pro quo. Even a "bilateral" approach 
to labor-management relations does not significantly replace the 
absence of bargainable issues and loss of "consumer influence." The 
limitations endured by federal sector collective bargaining have 
prompted some individuals to conclude that what occurs is not really 
collective bargaining. 
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CHAPTER III 
A COMPARISON OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS PROVISIONS 
The purpose of Chapter III is two-fold. First, commonalities in 
collective bargaining agreements from the federal, nonfederal public, 
and private sectors will be presented .. Second, a comparative review 
of issues present in collective bargaining agreements in the three 
sectors will be made. This will depict the extent to which the evident 
differences in the three sectors is translated from the theoretical 
framework of the literature to the pragmatic framework of the actua 1 
collective bargaining agreement. 
Commonalities in Collective Bargaining 
Agreements 
Agreement studies are necessarily complex. Language is legalisti-
cally complicated, sometimes elusive, and quite often, basically 
unclear. Written agreements provisions are often interpreted dif-
ferently by a third party than by the parties to an agreement. Studies 
can only reflect the interpretation by the entity performing analysis. 
Hence, the Bureau of Labor Statistics publications are limited in this 
regard. Further, the extraction of information from published sta-
tistics, such as those providing the basis for this chapter, introduces 
a second-order problem of interpretation. Not only is much detail 
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lost, but the effects of two judgment processes have been introduced 
into the resulting data. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, 
this methodology will assist in the elucidation of the differences in 
principal agreement provisions from the three sectors. 
In 1971, 1643 collective bargaining agreements existed. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics studied a sample of 671 of these agreements. 
All agreements covering 500 or more employees, and 25 percent of the 
remaining agreements were examined. All agreements had an effective 
date prior to November 1971 (37). 
Though agreement language varies, basic issues are less diverse. 
Table II presents those provisions identified in 50 percent or more of 
the collective bargaining agreements examined, as reflected by the 
report published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Agreements in the nonfederal public sector present a wide array 
of issues. Four hundred (400) agreements included in the published 
study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics reflect the issues of agree-
ments as negotiated with employees of states, counties, cities, and 
special districts. Agreements included in the study were in effect 
on or after January 1, 1974 (38). 
Table III reflects the issues contained in 50 percent or more of 
the agreements according to the statistics published by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
Approximately two-thirds of the agreements filed with the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics were examined to produce the statistics on which 
the private sector study was based. Analysis of 1339 agreements con-
cerning 1,000 workers or more provides the basis for the Bureau's 
publication. Agreements examined were in effect on or after July 1, 
TABLE II 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL SECTOR AGREEMENTS 
PRINCIPAL .PROVISIONS 
I. Hours of Word and Overtime 
Daily and Weekly hours 
.,.~overtime 
Overtime equalization 
Right to refuse overtime 
Notice of schedule changes 
II. Health and Safety 
Safety committees 
Unsafe conditions 
III. Leave Policies 
~"Annual leave 
Sick leave 
IV. Personnel Actions 
Promotions 
Reductions in force 
Training opportunities 
V. Employee Organization Activities 
Organization affairs and meetings 
*Publicity 
'l~'l~Re pres en ta ti on 
Visitation rights 
Check-off for dues withholding 
Leave for union business 
VI. Labor-Management Activities 
Cooperation committees 
*Grievance procedures 
;'cArbi tra ti on 
-/( - 70 percent 
"irl~ - 90 percent 
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TABLE III 
CHARACTERISTICS OF AGREEMENTS IN STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS 
I. Union Security, M.anagement Rights, and 
Related Provisions 
Exclusivity 
*Check-off for dues withholding 
Management rights 
Savings clauses 
*Anti-discrimination 
Employee organization publicity 
Visitation rights 
Personnel actions 
Probation periods 
Promotions 
II. Wage and Related Provisions 
'""Rate s true ture 
*Wage adjustments 
III. Hours, Overtime, and Premium Pay 
Scheduled weekly hours 
IV. Paid and Unpaid Leave 
*Vacation plans 
*Paid holidays 
Work rates on paid holidays 
Payments for time not worked 
'""Sick leave 
Funeral leave 
Call-in/call-back payments 
Pay for time on employee organizational business 
V. Job Security Provisions 
Reduction in force 
VI. Dispute Settlement 
*Grievance procedures 
i(Arbi tration 
Limitation on work stoppages 
* - 70 percent 
'""* - 90 percent 
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1973. Issues reflecting provisions contained in 50 percent or more of 
these agreements, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics are 
identified in Table IV (39). 
Comparison of Principal Agreement Provisions 
Since the formats of the previous tables are not strictly 
parallel, the issues involved were grouped into similar categories. 
Provisions in the agreements of the three sectors are compared in as 
much detail as possible .• 
Table V includes condensed information from the previous three 
tables, and presents a comparative view of collective bargaining agree-
ments. An "x" reflects the presence of the provision in 50 percent or 
more of the agreements examined from the particular sector. 
While an extensive analysis of the agreement provisions is impos-
sible from the foregoing, Table V does serve to provide pertinent 
illustrative comparisons among the three sectors. While one must 
proceed cautiously in interpreting Table V, it indicates that some of 
the "theoretical" differences expected from an examination of the 
employment characteristics of the three sectors have been transmitted 
to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements. It is 
important to reiterate for the purpose of analytical consideration 
that this table was derived by considering substantive agreement 
provisions that appeared in 50 percent or more of the agreements exam-
ined from each of the three sectors. It was not the purpose of this 
table to provide an examination of every issue contained in the agree-
ments from the three sectors, but rather to identify the trends that 
emerge. 
TABLE IV 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENTS 
PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS 
I. Union Security, Management Rights, and 
Related Provisions 
Management rights clauses 
i(Union security 
**Anti-discrimination 
*Check-off provisions 
II. Wage-Related Provisions 
**iMethods of compensation 
**Basic rate structure 
*Shift differentials 
*Wage adjustments 
III. Overtime 
i(Daily overtime 
Weekly overtime 
*Daily overtime rates 
Weekly overtime rates 
Scheduled weekly hours 
*Premium pay for weekends 
IV. Leave Provisions 
Leave of absence for union business 
idcVaca tion plans 
Payments for time not worked 
Funeral leave 
Jury leave 
icPaid holidays 
Payment for time on union business 
*Reporting pay 
Call-in/call-back pay 
V. Seniority Provisions 
Retention of seniority during layoffs 
VI. Job Security 
Subcontracting limitations 
Restriction on work by non-unit personnel 
Advance notice 
VII. Dispute Settlement 
**Grievance machinery 
~'dcArbi tra ti on 
~'dcBan on strikes/lockouts 
* - 70 percent 
*ic - 90 percent 
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TABLE V 
A COMPARISON OF PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS INCLUDED IN 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
Agreement Provisions 
HOURS, OVERTIME, AND PREMIUM PAY 
Daily overtime 
Weekly overtime 
Daily overtime rate 
Weekly overtime rate 
Scheduled weekly hours 
Premium pay for weekends 
Right to refuse overtime 
Schedule changes 
Overtime equalization 
WAGE AND RELATED PROVISIONS 
Methods of compensation 
Basic rate structure 
Shift differentials 
Wage adjustments 
Reporting pay 
Call-in/call-back pay 
Paid holidays 
Rates for work on paid holidays 
LEAVE POLICIES 
Payments for time not worked 
Annual leave 
Funeral leave 
Jury leave 
Sick leave 
Union business 
Vacation 
I.eave (unpaid) for union business 
JOB SECURITY 
Subcontracting 
Work by non-unit personnel 
Advance notice 
Reduction in force 
Seniori.ty 
-----Type of Agreement-----
Federa l State/ Industrial 
Local (Private) 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
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TABLE V (Continued) 
Agreement Provisions 
-----Type of Agreement-----
Federa l State/ Industrial 
Local (Private) 
UNION SECURITY, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS, AND 
RELATED PROVISIONS 
Union .shop 
Exclusivity 
Check-offs 
Management rights 
Savi.ngs clauses 
Organizational affairs and meetings 
Organizational publicity 
Visitation rights 
Personnel actions 
Promotions 
Probationary period 
Training 
Health and safety committees 
Union-management cooperation committees 
Representation 
Anti-discrimination 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS 
Grievance procedures 
Arbi tra ti on 
Limitation on work stoppages 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
It is evident that variations exist among the agreement provisions 
' in the three sectors. There is not only a noticeable difference 
between the private and public sector agreements, but there seems to be 
an equally evident chasm between the federal and nonfederal public 
sector agreements. 
This is especially apparent in two areas: 1) wages and related 
provisions, and 2) union security. In the first, there seems to be a 
noted similarity between the existence of wage related concerns in the 
nonfederal public sector and the private sector. The absence of these 
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provisions in the federal sector is notable. In the second case, 
union security, it is evident that the private sector has not, as yet, 
become either active or successful in seeking and obtaining these 
particular "benefits." That subject, however, is not principally 
germane to this document. In the examination of agreement provisions 
it is evident that the differences between the three sectors extend 
past the "theoretical framework" to the actual collective agreement 
provisions. 
CHAPTER IV 
COST ISSUES IN FEDERAL SECTOR COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
Fundamental differences between collective bargaining in the 
various employment sectors were established in Chapter II and III. Not 
only have the private sector and public sector been differentiated, but 
the federal sector has been shown to have some important differences 
from the remainder of the public sector. 
In Chapter IV certain issues in collective bargaining in the 
federal sector will be further examined. After consideration of several 
issues, an investigation will be presented regarding the feasibility 
of establishing a model for cost determination of federal sector col-
lective bargaining agreements. 
Many articles have been written, and diverse opinions expressed, 
regarding the compatibility of collective bargaining and the merit 
system. In the case of the federal government, the issue is the 
compatibility of the process of collective bargaining with the Civil 
Service System. 
Several issues for consideration are raised by Feigenbaum. Most 
important to this consideration are seniority and pay structure (30, 
p. 200). Likewise, similar issues are raised by other authors. Lewin 
and Horton include wage determination, managerial "rights", productivity, 
and personnel administration in their examination (40, p. 200). They 
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suggest that despite substantial changes in public sector labor rela-
tions, literature dealing with collective bargaining in government 
"remains essentially static in terms of issues addressed, conceptualiza-
tion, and methodology." They attribute the state of the literature to 
a lack of ''empirical examination," and characterize it as "preoccupied 
with normative and processual issues." Their further analysis, however, 
points out the difficulties and dangers of attempting any systematic 
study that approaches methodological robustness. 
Many of the same issues impinge on the issue of cost determination 
in federal sector collective bargaining. The issue of cost determina-
tion of collective bargaining agreements in the federal sector appears 
to be more often approached with emotionalism than rational objectivity. 
Such a condition is not totally unexpected, since personnel "migrating" 
to the federal sector from the private sector would bring such attitudes 
connnon in private management. 
As has been evidenced, public sector collective bargaining is not 
simply a "transplantation" of private sector collective bargaining into 
the milieu of the public sector. It is much more pervasive. In 
addition, principal issues of federal sector collective bargaining 
agreements do not exactly parallel those of the remaining portion of 
the public sector. 
Unfortunately, cost determination efforts have been directed solely 
toward wage and salary structures and supplemental benefits. David and 
Sheifer begin their examination of the issue by stating, "Measuring the 
cost of collective bargaining settlements used to be a simple matter 
of computing changes in wage rates" (4.1, p. 16). After such an implicit 
segue suggesting further developments, however, one interested in the 
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totality of costs in public sector collective bargaining is disappointed 
to find the treatment extends no further than to the issues of wages, 
salaries, and benefits. Similarly, the effort by Royster and Patterson 
fails to examine any issues outside those of wages and salaries (42, 
p. 13). In addition, neither of these attempts specifically addresses 
the issue in the context of the federal sector. 
Given this serious limitation of current literature, a conceptual-
ization will be presented to provide a framework under which to conduct 
a scrutiny of cost issues. 
A Cost Typology 
The costs imposed by collective bargaining may generally be 
characterized as: (1) costs created by the provisions incorporated 
into a collective bargaining agreement, and (2) de facto costs of col-
lective bargaining. For convenience, the terms "proviso costs" and 
"de facto costs" will be used to refer to these respective classifica-
tions. These two categories will be considered mutually exclusive. 
The criterion applied to determine in which of the two categories an 
item should be included is whether the item does or does not emerge from 
one or more provisions of !!_ particular collective bargaining agreement. 
If it does, it may be considered a proviso cost of that particular 
agreement. If the cost item does not result from provisions of a 
particular agreement, but would exist regardless of the specific agree-
ment, it is a~ facto cost. In examining costs, consideration of~ 
facto costs logically preceeds the consideration of proviso costs. 
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De facto Costs 
~ facto costs are those arising from the consideration of col-
lective bargaining as collective bargaining per se, i.e., as an 
additional agency process; de facto cos ts do not result from any . 
particular agreement or provision. These costs are relatively stable; 
and since they are not attributable to agreement provisions, they would 
exist regardless of the particular agreement in force. 
Several typical ~ facto costs include: (1) labor relations staff 
salaries and support; (2) management training; and (3) negotiations 
costs. These "significant costs" are principally the ones which were 
identified by the Office of Management and Budget and Civil Service 
Commission in their published guidelines (43). The first category is 
quite self-evident. The latter two, however, warrant additional com-
ment. 
Management training has been identified as a most important con-
cern for an effective labor-management relations program. To operate 
in an environment controlled by a collective bargaining agreement, 
management (including supervisors) must be familiar with the provisions 
of the collective bargaining agreement in force as well as its legal 
antecedents - in the federal sector, Executive Order 11491, as amended. 
In order to provide adequate knowledge in these regards, personnel 
must have available not only an initial training program, but also one 
that is on-going. Such a program necessitates development of materials 
as well as availability of staff to conduct training. Additional costs 
in a training program include the indirect and overhead cos ts of faci li-
ties. Portioned salary costs of the participants for the period during 
which training is conducted is also often included in the training costs. 
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Executive Order 11491, as amended, permits negotiations to be 
conducted, at least in part, on official agency time. In addition, 
management representatives require significant preparation time for 
negotiations. Hence, the costs of, negotiations encompass not only 
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portioned salary costs of management and union participants during the 
negotiation sessions co9ducted on official time, but the appropriate 
management preparation time as well. Costs for facilities, either 
direct or indirect, are also relevant to negotiations expenses. 
An assessment of de facto costs does not, however, represent true 
agency costs. This is primarily due to the integration of collective 
bargaining with the personnel function. Since the provisions in col-
lective bargaining agreements address issues which would generally be 
dealt with by the agency even in the absence of collective bargaining, 
the result is only a "shift" of responsibility. Consequently, the 
staff and training required to handle the procedural issues in a col-
lective bargaining agreement would often be required even in its 
absence. 
Proviso Costs 
Proviso costs have their basis in the provisions of a particular 
col lee ti ve bargaining agreement. Such cos ts may be either direct or 
indirect; if an agency actually encumbers and releases funds for a 
specified provision, it is a direct cost. A provision that impacts an 
agency process in such a way as to demand personnel and facilities, but 
results in no direct disbursement of funds, is an indirect expense. It 
should be noted that provisions may have both direct and indirect cost 
components. 
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Direct Proviso Costs 
Possibly the most obvious direct proviso cost is that of check-off 
provisions for dues withholding. If the agency is unable to recover 
the full cost of providing this service to the union, a direct cost 
results. Printing copies of agreements is another example of a direct 
proviso cost. Other such direct proviso costs exist, but they are 
overshadowed by management concern expressed for issues included under 
indirect proviso costs. 
Indirect Proviso Costs 
As was illustrated in Chapter III, collective bargaining in the 
federal sector, more than in either the private or public nonfederal, 
is principally confined to issues that are essentially procedural. 
Cost questions are necessarily complicated by this phenomenon. The 
issues raised by Lewin and Horton in their consideration of the apparent 
collective bargaining - "merit system" conflict provide an appropriate 
point of departure for the consideration of proviso costs. The issues 
given are wage determination, "management rights," productivity, and 
personnel administration. 
In the federal sector, the issue of wage and salary determination 
is essentially verboten, as has been discussed in Chapter II. Likewise, 
the "management rights" issue presents little actual problem to the 
cost determination question, since the issue is clearly delineated, 
and does not greatly affect cost determination. The remaining two 
issues, however, have been voiced as major concerns in cost determina-
tion of federal sector collective bargaining agreements. These concerns 
are most appropriately included in consideration of indirect proviso 
costs. 
Indirect proviso costs arise chiefly from two areas of concern. 
First, the impact of additional or .modified procedures imposed on the 
agency; and second, the impact of employee activities. Both of these 
areas have as a basis, concern for employee "productivity" or agency 
"efficiency." 
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Productivity. The term "productivity" (P) generally denotes a 
relationship between outputs (0) and inputs (I) in a production process 
(44, p. 11). This relationship is often expressed symbolically as 
P = 0/I 
which is essentially a measure of efficiency. However, as Balk points 
out, this is deceptive, since no consideration is given to quality of 
the output (45, p. 130). He notes that consumer "satisfaction" with 
the output (S) must enter the equation, and suggests 
P = O/I + O/S. 
While, theoretically, this more accurately adapts the concept of pro-
ductivity to the "service" portion of the economy, it nevertheless 
suffers major setbacks in its attempted application. In attempts to 
assess productivity within this theoretical framework, the difficulties 
that arise in obtaining measures of input and output result in the 
substitution or approximation of data, which in many cases may not be 
consistent with productivity concepts (46, p. 9). Further, if one is 
to obtain an index relating to the consumer "satisfaction" with an 
output, one necessarily must enter an emotional, intangible region. 
Further, in the federal government, most service activities are 
indirect. It is acknowledged that: 
it is often difficult to define and quantify the out-
puts of government organizations since they usually do not 
produce clearly specified physical products such as those 
in the goods-producing sectors of the private economy (47, 
p. 17). 
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Additionally, services are often~ directly "cons.urned" by the public. 
Any attempt to judge whether or not an indirect service is "satis-
factory" seems doomed to oblivion. Hence, the entire issue of "pro-
ductivity" in this setting approaches superfluousness. 
Productivity had its genesis in the industrial production setting. 
That fact assists in explaining the development of the concept of 
productivity. The production process may be depicted as: 
INPUT ---~ Production Process ---~ OUTPUT. 
In the industrial production setting, control is exerted over the pro-
duction process; as important, however, is the fact that control is 
also exhibited over the input. In addition, inputs and outputs are 
generally easily reduced to a conunonality - units of monetary value. 
However, in some service areas, typical of those often provided 
by the federal government, management has little or no control over 
the input. This means that even though control is exhibited over the 
"production," output will be as erratic as input, since if P = I/O, 
under a stable production process the output is necessarily a function 
of the input. 
An example will illustrate this point. The Supreme Court obtains 
its workload from lower federal and state supreme courts. Suppose, 
however, that only one case requested review. Despite their potential 
productivity, the nine justices could not affect their actual pro-
ductivity, since their input was externally determined. 
The implications seem apparent. Productivity indices in service 
areas are deceptive, if not grossly misrepresentative. 
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In an attempt to overcome some of the measurement difficulties 
implicit in denoting in.puts, "real output per hour of work" is often 
used to define productivity (48, p. 1). This simplifies the measure-
ment of inputs, perhaps to meaninglessness. It makes no strides, how-
ever, toward solution of the problem surrounding the measurement of 
outputs. While the reduction of output to workload figures reduces 
the complexity of measuring outputs, workload figures can also approach 
meaninglessness, since quality is often not considered (49, p. 13). 
Further, these "improvements" toward productivity measurement still do 
not address either the problem of reduction of inputs and outputs to 
common units of measure or the problem of external control of inputs. 
Even if these problems were absent when applied to organizational-
level activities, problems remain when one attempts to assess .the con-
tributation of !!:.!l individual within the organization to the organiza-
tional output. Such a consideration would be necessary in approaching 
many of the costs of collective bargaining. As an example, the con-
sideration of union representation time is illustrated. 
Some would suggest that the cost of representational time is the 
cumulation of the products of the time spent by stewards on union 
business and their hourly rates of pay. Others would argue that this 
amount is too low, since (1) the union representative, during time 
spent on representational activity, is generally interacting with one 
or more other employees who are also not conducting agency business; 
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and (2) the representational process inherently impacts "productivity" 
negatively, if not directly, at least indirectly. 
Both of these considerations could be justified and would be 
nearly correct if the service production of an agency followed a pro-
duction line model. In such a case the activity of each individual 
could be more accurately modeled. This is true until one introduces 
the effect of "interstage storage," (50, p. 270) which, while more 
analagous to the production situation within the service agency dealing 
with indirect public service, is still not an exact parallel. Hence, 
even if the number of hours spent on union representation were avail-
able, such a figure would be only a very gross representation, and of 
minute bene.fit to assessing impact of representation on the agency. 
(Note, however, that since time ciocks are illegal in the executive 
offices of Washington, D. C., the problem of acquiring any accurate 
time records is exacerbated L5l/). 
The issue of productivity in service-oriented government operation 
is well summarized by Hatry and Fisk. Their comments are directed to 
local governments, but apply equally to other governmental levels. 
Regarding the data collected about government service operations, they 
state: 
Records are kept of dollars spent, man-hours employed and 
other indications of the workload. But such data at best 
only hint at productivity. It is as if reports on flood 
control projects listed the number and sizes of dams con-
structed, the tons of cement purchased and poured, the 
hours worked and the dollars expended--but failed to reveal 
whether or not there was still flooding in the valley (49, 
p. viii). 
Impact .Q!l Personnel Administration. The second area of considera-
tion included in the examination of indirect proviso costs is that of 
the impact on personnel administration. This area is equally filled 
with ambiguity, and suffers from many of the problems plaguing the 
consideration of productivity. 
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Many of the procedural issues included in federal sector col-
lective bargaining agreements affect personnel administration by 
requiring the agency to implement or follow certain prescribed pro-
cedures (e.g., merit promotion, Equal Employment Opportunity, grievance 
procedures). Assessing these procedures is difficult, since they would 
require an analysis of the impact on productivity in the personnel 
administration function. It should be noted, however, that a shift of 
responsibility regarding a personnel administration function from else• 
where in an agency to "labor relations" does not represent an increase 
of agency costs. Hence, such activities cannot be characterized as 
cos ts of collective bargaining. 
Benefits 
In many of the activities resulting from provisions of collective 
bargaining agreements, the agency may actually benefit in one of 
several ways. Increased employee awareness and acceptance of pro-
cedures may result. Agency procedures may be streamlined by mere 
uniformity. Employee morale may be affected by the impact of collective 
bargaining on personnel administration function. Certainly, any such 
benefit is a "negative cost" and should therefore be included in a 
model. But, like many cost issues, benefits cannot be adequately 
measured or reduced to monetary units. 
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Framework of Cost Relationships 
Processual Relationships 
The outcomes of collective bargaining are issues of central 
interest not only in the field of industrial relations (52, p. 46), 
but in public employment as well. Kochan and Wheeler have established 
a general framework for analysis of bargaining outcomes. It is depicted 
in Figure 1. 
Environmental llnio11 and Bargaining Bargaining 
Characteristics ---~>l\fanagement----~ Process -------Outcomes 
Organizational 
Characteristics 
Source: Kochan, Thomas A. and Hoyt N. Wheeler. 
"Municipal Collective Bargaining: A 
Model and Analysis of Bargaining Outcomes," 
Industrial ~ Relations Review, 29, l 
(October, 1975), p. 51. 
Figure 1. A Framework for Analysis of Collective 
Bargaining Outcomes 
This framework is explained by Kochan and Wheeler. They state 
that the framework 
. illustrates in summary form the complex linkages 
we feel relate various environmental, organizational, and 
bargaining process characteristics with the outcomes of 
bargaining. 
The bargaining process is viewed as the channel through 
which most of the independent variables, and especially the 
organizational characteristics of the union and the management, 
have an impact on outcomes. Thus the conceptual model shown 
here suggests that the environment has both a direct impact 
on outcomes and an indirect impact through its effect on 
the characteristics of the parties and the b~rgaining pro-
cess (52, p. 46). 
The earlier consideration of de facto and proviso costs has 
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established that environment characteristics and pre-existing manage-
ment characteristics (e.g., personnel function characteristics, etc.) 
are relevant to cost consideration. Hence the conceptual cost typology 
developed and presented seems compatible with the analysis framework 
developed by Kochan and Wheeler. A merger of these two conceptualiza-
tions is presented in Figure 2. 
COSTS OF 
,-----COLLECTIVE-·-·,;.· 
l BARGAINING 
I 
I 
I 
De Facto Proviso 
. ' r---- ----------------..---, I 
I • k i l · I 
I I ! 
I I I I 
En~irotlmental Union and Bargaining Bargaining 
Characteristics - Management~ Process - Outcomes 
Or2anizational 
Characteristics 
·Figure 2. Collective Bargaining 
Outcomes and Costs 
This figure illustrates the dichotomy that was introduced in the 
conceptual typology for cost determination. As illustrated, ~ ~ 
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costs are those arising from the pre-existing environmental char-
acteristics of the organization, and from the bargaining process. 
Proviso costs. arise from the results of the bargaining process - a 
specific collective bargaining agreement. 
Source-~ Relationships 
The issues involved in collective bargaining agreement cost deter-
mination presented in the first section of this chapter may be graph-
ically summarized as presented in Figure 3. 
COSTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
~·~ 
""'o-e""'F,_a ... ct_o _ Proviso 
~"--D~r~:0 .. -. -~.:----,:Ji~!fi::m) 
_ _______,I/,"" ~ l 
Responsibilities . 
Assumed by Collective 
Bargaining from 
Otlter Areas of 
Agency 
Activities 
Unique 
to 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Productivity,. 
Efficiency, 
Employee Morale, 
"Overhead", etc. 
Figure 3. Collective Bargaining Costs: 
Type and Source 
This figure illustrates the primary types of cost consideration - de 
facto and proviso costs, and the "negative host" issue presented by 
benefits which are accrued by the agency from the collective bargaining 
process. The figure further illustrates that the cost conceptualiza-
tion frfmework produces three sources of cost concerns. 
First, some ~ facto costs and direct proviso costs result from 
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a shift of responsibility resulting from collective bargaining. These 
are not, therefore, ~ incremento costs . 
. Second, many indirect proviso costs and "benefits" arise from 
consideration of areas of productivity, efficiency, employee morale, 
and the agency "overhead" costs. These costs are generally unassess-
able. 
Finally, there are some direct proviso costs resulting from 
activities which are unique to collective bargaining. These are, 
however, generally directly obtainable, and not of sufficient magnitude 
to be an overwhelming concern. 
This framework depicts the important relationships relevant to 
consideration of the costs of collective bargaining. It illustrates 
the problem involved in any attempted analysis. While general rela-
tionships may be established, the exact relationships necessary for 
development of a mathematical planning model cannot be established. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Federal management's concern for a model for cost determination 
in collective bargaining has arisen due to the convergence of several 
conditions. The phenom.enon of an era of "homo mathematicus" largely 
produced by the advent of electronic computers joined by concern with 
rising taxes, and a characterization that government "costs a great 
deal but does not achieve much" (53, p. 3), have produced an over-
whelming concern for consideration of costs and the development of 
mathematical planning models. 
Important characterizations establish collective bargaining in 
the federal sector as unique. Its particular service orientation and 
legal framework for collective bargaining separate it from the remainder 
of the public sector. This separation is evidenced by the differential 
of issues contained in the collective bargaining agreements. Pro-
visions of federal sector collective bargaining agreements are largely 
procedural and integrated with the personnel function. Issues addressed 
are often ones which would be conducted by the agency even in the 
absence of collective bargaining, and are not solely attributable to 
collective bargaining agreements. 
Cost issues of collective b~rgaining may be identified as either 
~facto or proviso costs. Examinatiqn of cost issues under this 
conceptual framework produces four conclusions. 
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First, some issues may represent true additional costs to the 
agency, but are generally directly determinable, of relatively 
"minimal" magnitude, and hence, of minute concern. 
Second, the impact of remaining issues in collective bargaining 
agreements on agency productivity is not determinable because (a) direct 
relationships to activities cannot be assigned, and (b) productivity 
in white-collar activities is generally not measurable, since services 
type outputs as well as inputs are largely unquantifiable. Hence, 
indirect costs are essentially unobtainable. 
Third, since the issues involved in federal sector collective 
bargaining are primarily procedural and their impact is largely inter• 
related to the agency personnel function, an ~ priori analysis of cost 
relationships is difficult to make. This is due to the unavailability 
of appropriate data and the non-specifiable nature of the relationships. 
Finally, some issues the cost of which seems easily obtained do 
not constitute~ incremento costs. 
Any attempt to develop a mathematical planning model in the area 
of cost determination for federal sector collective bargaining agree-
ments seems to be hopelessly confused by the innate characteristics 
of federal sector collective bargaining. The limitations which would 
have to be placed on the model would reduce its usefulness and would, 
in fact, be ludicrously speculative. 
that: 
Stahl, discussing personnel administration, has stated his belief 
public personnel administration is in less need of improved 
technology than it is of a broader philosophy. Accordingly, 
it needs more philosophers in proportion to technologists. 
And it needs more searching inquiries in the realm of ideas 
and less concentration on methods (54, p. 427). 
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Much the same argument can be made for federal sector labor-management 
relations, especially in the determination of the costs of collective 
bargaining agreements. 
Collective bargaining in the federal sector - characterized by the 
concept of bilateralism - is unique. I~ has arisen under atypical 
circumstances when compared to its nonfederal counterparts and demands 
administration conducted in a "new environment," respectful of its 
uniqueness. While, as managers, officials dealing with collective 
bargaining must be sensitive to cost issues, they must, as person-
nelists, place cost issues in perspective to other issues raised by 
collective bargaining. 
Federal sector collective bargaining, as a process, can be bene-
ficial not only to employees, but also the employer and to the public 
to which the employer is ultimately responsible. Collective bargaining 
can streamline necessary agency procedures, improve the agency environ-
ment and ultimately, possibly increase the quality and quantity of 
services provided to the public. These are issues that are necessarily 
subjective and must be based on sound management judgment and experi-
ence. 
Bennett has indicated that: 
when public services are not directly felt by the public~ 
manager i§. the only .Q!l&. in a position to determine how effec-
tive and complete the service being rendered is (16, p. 547). 
(Emphasis Added.) 
Analysis of the costs of collective bargaining seems analagous to the 
evaluation of indirect services; in the federal environment, agency 
management alone can determine the costs of collective bargaining and 
many of these costs are not adequately translated into monetary units. 
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Since federal sector managers dealing with collective bargaining are 
not concerned with wages, salaries, and benefits, little is left about 
which to be cost conscious. Federal management, therefore, should 
direct its attention toward the intangible and more emotional issues 
related to collective bargaining. While not susceptible to reduction 
to mathematical and cost formats, these areas are nevertheless important, 
but require subjective, not empirical analysis. Hence, the establ\;sh-
ment of a mathematical model is inappropriate for cost determination of 
collective bargaining agreements in the federal sector. 
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